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authorities, her supervisors and
coworkers initiated a pattern of
harassment that resulted in her resignation on March 7, 1997, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). (A
claim for "constructive discharge"
requires that a plaintiff prove that
the employer intentionally made
plaintiffs working conditions so
intolerable that a reasonable person
would feel forced to resign, and that
the plaintiff did in fact resign.)

ISSUE
Does the six-year limitations period
in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) apply to
retaliatory discharge actions under
the Federal False Claims Act, or
should courts apply the most closely
analogous state limitations period?

Wilson claimed she had been constructively discharged in retaliation
for her reporting her coworkers'
allegedly improper activities.
Deciding that the six-year limitations period of the Act did not apply
to the retaliation claim, the district
court applied North Carolina's
three-year limitations period for
wrongful discharge actions and dismissed Wilson's claim as untimely.

FACTS
Karen Wilson was a part-time secretary at the Graham County Soil &
Water Conservation District in
North Carolina. On January 25,
2001, Wilson filed a -qui tam"
action in federal district court in
North Carolina under 31 U.S.C. §
1330(b) of the Federal False Claims
Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733)
(FCA), alleging that several of her
former coworkers had intentionally
submitted false claims for reimbursement from three programs created or funded by the federal government in violation of § 3729 of
the FCA. Wilson's complaint also
alleged a claim for constructive discharge, claiming that, after she
reported her concerns to federal

(Continued on Page 402)
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Wilson then appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. Reversing the district court,
the Fourth Circuit held that the
application limitations period was
the six-year statute of limitations
provided by the FCA. 367 F.3d 248
(4th Cir. 2004). Pointing out that §
3731(b) could have provided that a
"civil action under section 3730(a)
or (b) may not be brought more
than six years from the date the violation of § 3729 is committed," the
Fourth Circuit observed that
Congress did not do so. Stating that
an action under § 3730(h) protesting retaliation is a "civil action
under § 3730," the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the plain language of
§ 3731(b) compelled the conclusion
that the six-year limitation period in
that section applies to retaliation
claims.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear
the Conservation District's appeal.
125 S.Ct. 823 (2005).
CASE ANALYSIS
Originally enacted in 1863, the
Federal False Claims Act imposes
civil liability upon any person who,
among other things, knowingly presents or causes to be presented to
an officer or employee of the United
States government a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.
The defendant is liable for up to treble damages and a civil penalty of
up to $10,000 per claim.
An FCA action may be commenced
in one of two ways. First, the government may bring an action under
§ 3730(a) against the alleged false
claimant. Second, under § 3730(b),
a private person (the "relator") may
bring a civil action known as a "qui
tam" action "for the person and for
the United States Government"
against the alleged false claimant "in
the name of the Government."
("Qui tam" is an abbreviation for
the Latin phrase qui tarn pro

domine nege qua pro sic ipso il
hoc sequitur,meaning "who pursues
this action on our Lord the King's
behalf as well as his own." It is
called a qui tam action because the
plaintiff states that he sues for the
government and for himself.) The
relator receives a share of any proceedings from the action-generally
between 15 percent to 25 percent if
the government intervenes in the
action and from 25 percent to 30
percent if it does not.
A "claim" means any request or
demand, whether under a contract
or otherwise, for money or property
that is made to a contractor,
grantee, or other recipient if the
United States government provides
any portion of the money or property that is requested or demanded.
The FCA reaches beyond claims
that might be legally enforced to all
fraudulent attempts to cause the
government to pay out sums of
money.
The FCA underwent major revision
in 1986, expanding the circumstances under which a citizen may
bring suit on behalf of the government, participate in the litigation,
and recover a share of the judgment. The 1986 amendments also
created a cause of action for retaliation in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Prior to
the 1986 amendments, § 3731(b)
had simply provided that "a civil
action under Section 3730 of this
title must be brought within six
years from the date the violation of
this title is committed." In 1986, §
3731(b) was amended to provide
that a civil action under § 3730 may
not be bought "more than 6 years
after the date on which the violation
of section 3729 is committed."
As amended in 1986, the FCA provides protection to individuals who
investigate or come forward with
evidence of fraud. A retaliation
claim can be maintained under the
FCA even if no FCA qui tam action
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is ultimately successful or even
filed. Relief for wrongful retaliation
may include reinstatement and double the amount of back pay to
which the employee is entitled plus
interest, as well as any special damages suffered, including litigation
costs and reasonable attorney fees.
A plaintiff asserting a retaliation
claim under the FCA must show
that (1) he or she engaged in protected conduct, i.e., conduct that
was in furtherance of filing an
action under the act, and (2) that
he or she was discriminated against
because of his or her protected conduct. In proving that he or she was
discriminated against because of
conduct in furtherance of an FCA
suit, a plaintiff must show that his
or her employer had knowledge that
the plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct, and that the plaintiff's
employer's retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the employee's engaging in protected conduct.
At that point, the burden shifts to
the employer to prove that the
employee would have been terminated even if the employee had not
engaged in the protected conduct.
Section 3731(b) of the FCA provides
that a "civil action under § 3730
may not be brought ... more than 6
years after the date on which the
violation" was committed. The
Conservation District argues that
the text of § 3731(b) "could not be
more plain." According to the
District, the six-year period applies
to claims brought under § 3730(a)
and (b). The District contends that
Congress did not intend for this limitations period to govern retaliatory
discharge actions filed under §
3730(h).
Wilson disagrees, arguing that
the plain meaning of § 3731(b)
compels the conclusion that the sixyear limitations period applies to
whistleblower retaliation claims
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under § 3730(h). She claims that
the Conservation District "makets]
a weak attempt at arguing that 'a
civil action under section 3730'
somehow does not include the retaliation action set forth in section
3730(h), and thereby does not provide an express limitations period."
Even if the statutory language were
ambiguous, Wilson argues, the
Supreme Court has previously recognized that there is a presumption
of resolving an ambiguity in favor of
including the federal claim within
the scope of the federal limitations
period-as opposed to concluding
that the claim has been given no
federal limitations period. In addition, she says that when it is a practical necessity to bring two federal
claims together, and if one of them
has an express federal statutory limitations period while the other does
not, that federal statutory period,
rather than a state-law limitations
period, should also be applied to the
other claim.
The Conservation District claims
that whether a violation of § 3729
has occurred is irrelevant to an
action for retaliatory discharge,
pointing out that to establish a
claim for retaliatory discharge a
plaintiff must merely hold a goodfaith belief that a violation of the
FCA has occurred. Because a claim
for retaliatory discharge does not
involve "a violation of section
3729," by its own terms, the
District says that § 3371(b) does
not apply to an action for retaliatory
discharge.
Disagreeing, Wilson declares that
this "is simply false." She claims
that there is a crucial nexus
between the two violations-a retaliation claim under § 3730 requires
an alleged violation of § 3729.
Furthermore, Wilson says the
approach that Congress adopted
achieved a "simplicity of adminis-

tration" by identifying a single,
readily identifiable point at which to
begin the limitations periods for all
actions under § 3730.
It is the Conservation District's position that Congress has used the
phrase "a civil action under section
3730" to mean different things in
different sections of the FCA. In certain places, the District says
Congress has used the phrase to
refer only to an action brought
under § 3730(a), and in others to
refer to a qui tam action filed under
§ 3730(b). According to the District,
in other sections the phrase refers
to actions under § 3730(a), §
3730(b), as well as § 3730(h).
Wilson responds that the District is
contending that the straightforward
language of § 3731(b) is ambiguous
by citing purported ambiguities in
other parts of the FCA employing
similar language. According to
Wilson, the District's ambiguity
argument fails because it does not
demonstrate how those other possible ambiguities render the operative
language in § 3731 ambiguous on
the point at issue.
The Conservation District suggests
that, because a tolling provision in §
3731(b)(2) does not apply to retaliation claims, it is absurd to apply the
six-year limitations period in §
3731(b)(1). Wilson responds that
the application of § 3731(b)(1) is
not dependent on the applicability
of § 3731(b)(2). She claims that
courts have applied § 3731(b)(1) to
certain qui tam actions even though
some of those courts have held that
§ 3731(b)(2) is not applicable to
them.
The Conservation District claims
that the legislative history of the
1986 amendments to the FCA confirms that Congress did not intend
for § 3731(b) to apply to an action
for retaliatory discharge. The

District asserts that the whistleblower provision in § 3730(h) was modeled after eight other federal
statutes. Noting that these statutes
provide for a limitations period of
180 days or less and the limitations
period accrues with the act of discharge or retaliation, the District
contends that the Fourth Circuit's
construction of the FCA is incongruent with every other whistleblower
statute enacted by Congress. Wilson
disagrees with the District's legislative history analysis. She says that
none of the history that the District
cites directly addresses the issue.
According to the Conservation
District, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation "produces a result that is
not only odd, but absurd."
Responding, Wilson argues that the
District in effect is contending that
the Supreme Court should disregard
the plain language because it results
in a limitations scheme that is
unusual and that, in the District's
view, leads to undesirable results.
Arguing that Congress has not
expressly provided for a limitations
period for a retaliatory discharge
action under § 3730(h), the
Conservation District concludes
that federal courts should apply the
most closely analogous state statute
of limitations. Wilson responds that
the Supreme Court has directed
that the limitations period of the
most closely analogous state cause
of action not be used if it would
interfere significantly with the purpose of the federal statute.
SIGNIFICANCE
The debate over the proper interpretation of § 3731(b) has divided
the federal circuits. The Ninth
Circuit has held that § 3731(b) does
not apply to retaliation actions. The
Fourth and Seventh Circuits have
determined that § 3731(b) applies
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to actions alleging a retaliation
claim. Of course, the Supreme
Court's decision will resolve this
conflict among the circuits.
In United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 162 F.3d 1027,
1034-36 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth
Circuit held that § 3731(b) does not
apply to retaliation claims under the
FCA. The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that the 1986 amendments, while
adding a provision "created the
retaliation claim but provided no
specific statute of limitations for
such claims." According to the
Ninth Circuit, in light of this perceived absence of a congressionally
prescribed statute of limitations,
"the most closely analogous statute
of limitations under state law must
fill the void."
In contrast, in Neal v. Honeywell,
Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 865-66 (7th Cir.
1994), the Seventh Circuit applied
the six-year limitation period in §
3731(b) to retaliation claims under
§ 3731(h). The employer in Neal
argued that § 3731(b)(1) could not
apply to retaliation claims, as a literal application of its terms would
lead to absurd results. The Seventh
Circuit disagreed, holding that the
revised language of § 3731(b)(1)
reflected Congress's decision to prioritize "simplicity of administration" and that the employer had
mischaracterized the consequences
of a literal reading of § 3731(b).
According to the Conservation
District, tying the commencement of
the limitations period in a retaliatory discharge action to anything other than the act of discharge or retaliation imposes a "tremendous burden
on employers and employees. It
would also produce a myriad of
bizarre outcomes (e.g., an employee
[sic] being barred from bringing a
retaliatory discharge action based
upon the statute of limitations when
the act of discharge or retaliation
has not yet occurred)."

Wilson, on the other hand, claims
that the limitations period of the
"most closely analogous" state law
would impose the onerous burden
on the whistleblower of making an
often difficult analysis of which
statute would apply, a burden compounded by a complex choice of law
analysis. She says placing such additional burdens on the whistleblower
would undercut one of the key purposes of the 1986 Amendments to
the FCA-to increase the incentives
to the whistleblower to file a qui
tam claim.
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